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A More Sensible Approach to Regulating Independent
Expenditures: Defending the Constitutionality of the
FEC's New Express Advocacy Standard

Michael D. Leffel
INTRODUCTION
Campaign finance reformers argue that the "unholy alliance of pri
vate money and public elections" has created "a crisis of confidence in
our elected officials. "1 The now-deceased campaign reform advocate
Philip M. Stem summed up the role of money in campaigns this way:

"[M]oney-power has replaced people-power as the driving force in
American politics and the determinant of electoral victory. "2
One form of "money-power" in elections that received a great
deal of attention in the last election cycle was "independent expendi
tures. "3 Independent expenditures are funds spent by interested individ
uals or groups - usually in the form of television or radio advertise
ments or mass mailings4 - to support or defeat a particular candidate,
but are not coordinated in any way with the candidate or her campaign
organization.5 The Federal Election Campaign A ct ("FECA" or "the
1. Ellen S. Miller & Philip M. Stem, Democratically Financed Elections, in
CHANGING AMERICA: BLUEPRINTS FOR THE NEW ADMINISTRATION 759 {Mark
Green et al. eds., 1992). Even elected officials have expressed concern. For example,
former Member of Congress Millicent Fenwick once remarked: "In my mind, there is
no question that there is a connection between these [campaign] contributions and
votes. I have sought votes and members have told me they received such-and-such an
amount of money from one of these groups and they could not vote with me." MARK
GREEN, WINNING BACK AMERICA 135 (1982) (quoting Rep. Millicent Fenwick (R
NJ)).
2. PHILIP M. STERN, STILL THE BEST CONGRESS MONEY CAN BUY 5 (1992).
3. See, e.g., Philip Dine, Labor, Business Groups Battle, Try To Advance Their
Agenda, ST. Lams POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 6, 1996, at A20; Donald Lambro, Election
Lesson Not Lost on GOP, WASH. TIMES, November 24, 1996, at Al; Michael
Resendes, Campaign Reform Flounders, Partisan Gulf on Spending Widens, BOSTON
GLOBE, November 24, 1996, at Al.
4. In addition to making independent expenditures for television advertising or
mass mailings, independent expenditures can be made to support paid political staff that
work in a variety of capacities to organize support for the candidate. See 2 U.S.C. §
431(17) (1994).
5. The requirement that the independent expenditure not be coordinated means that
the individual or group making the expenditure can have no contact with either the can
didate or her campaign. See 2 U.S.C. § 431(17) (1994) (defining "independent expendi
ture"). If there is coordination, then the expenditure is treated as a direct contribution.
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Act")6 requires individuals or groups making such expenditures to reg
ister with the Federal Election Committee ("FEC"), periodically to dis
close in their reports to the FEC the expenditures they have made,7 and
to identify themselves on the communication as the source of the elec
toral advocacy.8 The Act also prohibits corporations from making inde
pendent expenditures from their general treasury accounts.9 Failure to
comply with the FECA's requirements for independent expenditures
may

result

in

civil

or

criminal

prosecution,

including fines

or

imprisonment.10

See 2 U.S.C. § 431(17) (1994). Political party committees, however, like the Demo

cratic or Republican National Committees, are able to make some coordinated expendi
that are capped at a higher rate based on the voting-age population of the state for
Senate seats or House districts, thus exceeding the usual direct contribution limits
placed on individuals and Political Action Committees ("PACs"). See 2 U.S.C. 44 la(d)
(1994).
This Note only deals with legitimately uncoordinated independent expenditures. It
probably comes as no surprise that some elected officials do illegally coordinate with
groups making independent expenditures. See Eric Pianin, Ethics Panel Turns Eye To
Gramm, WASH. PosT. Sept. 8, 1995, at A19 (discussing Senator Packwood's diary en
try indicating that Packwood's top aide, Elaine Franklin, "breached a law prohibiting
candidates from soliciting organizations to make independept expenditures on their be
half"); David Sarasohn, Some Passages in Diary Look Familiar, PORTLAND OREGO
NIAN. Sept. 21, 1995, at CS (discussing fact that Packwood's diary indicates he had di
rect conversations regarding independent expenditures, and in some cases gave prior
approval to advertisements, by the National Rifle Association and the Auto Dealers
Association).
6. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3, as
amended by Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443,
88 Stat. 1263.
7. An individual or group that makes independent expenditures in excess of $1000
per year falls under the FECA's definition of a "political committee" and thus is re
quired to report and disclose such expenditures. See 2 U.S.C. § 431(4)(A) (1994) (de
fining "political committee"); 2 U.S.C. § 432 (1994) (listing organizational require
ments for committees); 2 U.S.C. § 433 (1994) (requiring committees to register with the
FEC); 2 U.S.C. § 434 (1994) (requiring committees to report expenditures to the FEC).
8. See 2 U.S.C. § 441d(a)(3) (1994); Notice of Authorization on Brochure, 1 Fed.
Election Camp. Fin. (CCH) 'lI 5554 at 10,676, 10,677 (Oct. 3, 1980).
9. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1994).
10. See 2 U.S.C. § 437g(d)( l)(A) (1994) (failure of a "political committee" to re
port expenditures can result in a fine not to exceed the greater of $25,000 or 300% of
any expenditure involved in such violation, or one year in jail, or both). The Federal
Election Commission, a bipartisan body created by the FECA, may also seek civil pen
alties for violations of the FECA. See 2 U.S.C. § 437d(a)(6) (1994). Many penalties are
collected by the FEC at the administrative level and can be substantial. See August
Doledrums, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 3, 1993, at A22 (FEC ordered Senator Robert Dole to
pay $100,000 in penalties as part of settlement); Robertson Must Repay Money From
'88 Race, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1993, at A9 (FEC ordered Robertson to pay almost
$22,000 in civil penalties). However, the FEC's penalty requests are sometimes reduced
or eliminated by courts. See FEC v. NRA Pol. Victory Fund, 778 F. Supp. 62, 66
(D.D.C. 1991) (FEC's requested $415,744.72 civil penalty reduced, defendant only retures
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During the 1996 election season; labor, environmental, and right
wing organizations combined to spend well over forty-six million dol
lars on "educating" voters about various issues.1 1 A major question
confrontiilg courts now is whether these "educational" spots are actu
ally independent expenditures that trigger the FECA's reporting and dis
closure requirements, or whether they purely advocate a particular posi
tion on an issue that, under the First Amendment, cannot be regulated.12
The problem for reformers who want to limit the impact of pur
portedly educational spending like that by groups such as the AFL-CIO
and the Christian Coalition is that, according to the Supreme Court, reg
ulating money in political elections is akin to regulating free speech be
cause money is so essential in modern times in enabling an individual
or group to disseminate its political message.13 Political speech is a cru-

quired to pay for FEC enforcement, investigation, and legal costs); FEC v. Ted Haley
Cong. Comm., 654 F. Supp. 1 120, 1 127 (W.D. Wash. 1 987) (refusing FEC penalty re
quest because defendant promptly corrected violation).
1 1. See George Church, The Balance of Power: The Republicans Hold the House,
but Speaker Gingrich Will Need To Find Common Ground with Gephardt's Democrats,
TIME, Nov. 18, 1996, at 53, 55 (noting that the AFL-CIO's $35 million in spending on
radio and television "were instrumental in defeating
several G.O.P. freshmen"
and that the Christian Coalition played a similar role on the right by distributing 45 mil
lion "voter guides" that consistently hammered Democrats on key issues like abortion);
John H. Cushman Jr., Environmentalists Ante Up To Sway a Number of Races: Spend
ing Millions to Promote Their Agendas, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1 996, at A13 (indicating
that the Sierra Club spent close to $7.5 million in the two-year election cycle, that this
"mimics closely" the approach taken by the Christian Coalition and the AFL-CIO, and
that the plan appears to have had some effect even before the election took place: Con
gress voted overwhelmingly this summer for a few bills favored by environmental
groups").
12. See U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 , 80 ( 1976)
(per curiam) (holding that the FEC cannot regulate strict issue advocacy); Richard L.
Berke, Lawsuit Says Christian Coalition Gave Illegal Help to Candidates, N.Y. TIMES,
July 31, 1996, at Al (noting that the FEC filed suit in the federal district court in the
District of Columbia alleging that the Christian Coalition, "the nation's largest group of
religious conservatives[,] had acted illegally to promote several Republican
candidates").
13. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 16. The Court stopped short of saying that "money is
speech." See 424 U.S. at 22; Cass Sunstein, Political Equality and Unintended Conse
quences, 94 CoLUM. L. REv. 1 390, 1394 ( 1994). The Court's reasoning, however, can
be explained most simply by Justice White's reference to the maxim that "money
talks." See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 262 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); see also OWEN M. F1ss. THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 14-15 (1996) (arguing
that money is not speech, but that expenditures "can still make claim to the First
Amendment"); James A. Gardner, Consent, Legitimacy and Elections: Implementing
Popular Sovereignty Under the Lockean Constitution, 52 U. PITT. L. R.Ev. 189, 252
(1990). But see J. Skelly Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85
YALE LJ. 1001 ( 1976) (suggesting that money is not the equivalent of speech). In
Buckley, the Court noted "[t]he Act's contribution and expenditure limitations operate
in an area of the most fundamental First Amendment activities." 424 U.S. at 14. The
•

.

•
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cial means of checking government abuses, realizing individual self
fulfillment, and creating a safety valve for society to discuss freely
grievances and proposed remedies - a means that is therefore jealously
guarded under the First Amendment.14 The Supreme Court therefore
treats the money spent as equivalent to speaking out on an issue and ap
plies a stricter level of scrutiny to the regulation of such spending.15
Thus, reformers must struggle to control the insidious role of money in
federal elections without discouraging the political speech that most
commentators contend "form[s] the core of the free speech principle."16
In order to protect free speech and association rights, the Supreme
Court in Buckley v. Valeo11 adopted an "express advocacy" standard,
which provides that communication can be regulated as an independent
expenditure only if it is "communication[] that in express terms advo
cate[s] the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate for fed
eral office."18 The Court indicated in a footnote that this defrnition
would limit the Act to communication containing words such as "vote
for" or "defeat."19 The Court determined that this narrower definition
would be clear enough to allow the FEC to regulate speech that exCourt reasoned that the future course of the country depends on the ability of the citi
zenry to make informed decisions with regard to candidates for elective office. This fact
gives the First Amendment its " 'fullest and most urgent application precisely to the
conduct of campaigns for political office.' " 424 U.S. at 15 (quoting Monitor Patriot
Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971)).
14. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring);
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (discussing
the marketplace of ideas); Vmcent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment The
ory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 521; Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech,
130 U. PA. L. REv. 591, 593 (1982) (emphasizing the value of self-realization); Harry
H. Wellington, On Freedom of Expression, 88 YALE Lj. 1105 (1979).
15. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 40-44, 64 (per curiam).
16. CASS R SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH
132 (1993); see also 3 RONALD D. ROTUNDA ET AL., TREATISE ON CONSTITU
TIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 20.50, at 278 (1986) (citing Buckley);
cf. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
17. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
18. 424 U.S. at 44 (emphasis added). The original definition of "independent ex
penditures" in the 1974 amended version of the FECA was any uncoordinated expendi
ture made "relative to a clearly identified candidate." 18 U.S.C. § 608(e)( l ) (Supp. V
1975) (repealed 1976). Current FEC regulations have incorporated the Buckley Court's
express advocacy standard into the definition of "independent expenditures," defming
the term as any expenditure
by a person expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified
candidate which is made without cooperation or consultation with any candidate,
or any authorized committee or agent of such candidate, and which is not made
in concert with, or at the request or suggestion of, any candidate, or any author
ized committee or agent of such candidate.
2 U.S.C. § 431(17) (1994) (emphasis added).
19. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44 n.52.
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pressly advocates for or against an identified candidate in an election
while not chilling political speech aimed at advocating issues - often
called "issue advocacy." 2 0
Under the Buckley ruling, Congress is forbidden to cap the amount
of money an individual or group may spend on independent expendi
tures.21 Buckley, however, allows the FECA's caps on the amount of di
rect contributions - money or in-kind services given by an individual
or group to a candidate that can be used in whatever way the candidate
chooses.22 Because of the caps on direct contributions, individuals and
groups seeking to influence elections have dramatically increased the
amount of money spent on independent expenditures since Buckley.23

20. See 424 U.S. at 81-82.
21. See 424 U.S. at 51.
22. See 424 U.S. at 26-27; see also 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(A)(i) (1994) (defining direct
contributions). The amended FECA limits individuals to maximum contributions of
$1000 to any single candidate per election, see 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(l)(A) (1994), with
an overall annual limitation of $25,000 by any contributor. See 2 U.S.C. § 44la(a)(3)
(1994). Registered political committees are limited to $5000 contributions to any single
candidate per election. See 2 U.S.C. § 44la(a)(2)(A) (1994). Other groups, not regis
tered as political committees, are limited to contributions of $1000 per candidate per
election. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(l )(A) (1994).
23. In 1978, two years after Buckley, independent expenditures totalled $310,000.
In 1986, $10.2 million was spent on independent expenditures during a nonpresidential
election year and $23.4 million was spent in this manner in the presidential election
year of 1984. See Candice J. Nelson, Loose Cannons: Independent Expenditures, in
MONEY, ELECTIONS, AND DEMOCRACY: REFORMING CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGN
FINANCE 47, 48-49 (Margaret Latus Nugent & John R. Johannes, eds., 1990) (citing
FEC Press Release, Oct 9, 1980; 1979-86: FEC P ress Release, Mar. 31, 1988 (corrected
release); 1988: FEC Post-general Election Reports (preliminary figures)). Reported in
dependent expenditures fell to $10.6 million in 1991-1992, see Federal Election Com
mission, 1992 PAC Activity Increases 7 (Jan. 1994) (press release), and to $5.1 million
in 1993-1994. See Federal Election Commission, 1994 PAC Activity Shows Little
Growth over 1992 Level 7 (Nov. 1995) (press release). Why the drop in independent
expenditures? Many campaign finance reform commentators note the intense rise in
"strict issue advocacy" pieces (as interpreted by the courts) which do not need to be re
ported. See Eliza Newlin Camey, Air Strikes, NATL. J., June 15, 1996, at 1313 (discuss
ing the "explosion of issue advocacy campaigns").
The role of independent expenditures has also been spurred on by today's high
dollar, television-driven congressional races. See STEPHEN ANS OLABEHBRE &
SHANTO IYENGAR, GOING NEGATIVE: How PoLmCAL ADVERTISEMENTS SHRINK
AND POLARIZE THE ELECTORATE 1-16 (1995); LARRY J. SABATO, THE RISE OF PO·
LmCAL CONSULTANTS: NEW WAYS OF WINNING ELECTIONS 117 (1981) (noting
that television is the predominant medium for informing voters). Serious candidates in a
contested House race can expect to spend one million dollars on their campaigns and
Senate candidates often spend in excess of ten million dollars. See Beth Donovan, Con
stitutional Issues Frame Congressional Options, 51 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 431, 434
(1993). Most candidates have no choice but to rely on large-dollar contributions from
individuals and PACs that seek to influence politicians and elections. FECA's caps on
direct contributions have made it somewhat more difficult for candidates to raise money
since they must have a larger number of contributors rather than relying on a few ex-
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At the same time, some courts have interpreted the "express advo
cacy" standard so narrowly as to allow individuals and groups essen
tially to evade even the FECA's reporting and disclosure requirements.24
In other words, not only do individuals and groups face no caps on in
dependent expenditures, but by merely changing the wording of an ad
vertisement that otherwise would be considered express advocacy, they
are permitted by some courts to make massive expenditures without
even reporting or disclosing such spending.25
The First Circuit has decided that the danger of chilling important
political speech requires a very narrow interpretation of the express ad
vocacy standard. Seizing on the language of the Buckley footnote,26 the
First Circuit adopted a strict, literal interpretation of the express advo
cacy standard, which looks only to the four comers of the communica
tion to see if the "magic words," such as "vote for" or "vote against,"
were used.27 If these magic words are not included, the communication
does not constitute express advocacy and thus no reporting and disclo
sure can be required.28

tremely wealthy donors. See LARRY J. SABATO & GLENN R. SIMPSON, DIRTY LIT11..B SECRETS: THE PERSISTENCE OF CORRUPTION IN AMERICAN PoLmCS 54, 333

(1996). As a result, some candidates have essentially begun to rely on the independent
expenditures by others to get out the candidate's message or attack her opponent. See
Richard Stengel & Eric Pooley, Masters of the Message: Inside the High-Tech Machine
that Set Clinton & Dole Polls Apart, TIME, Nov. 18, 1996, at 76, 82 (discussing how
President Clinton's campaign relied on "soft money" from the Democratic Party "[t]o
finance a massive TV buy" for particular "issue advocacy"); David E. Rosenbaum, In
Minnesota Race, Negative Ads Outnumber Lakes, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1996, at A13.
24. See, e.g., Faucher v. FEC, 928 F.2d 468 (1st Cir. 1991); see also infra note 84
(discussing other cases).
25. See infra section I.B.1. In addition to making independent expenditures or di
rect contributions to a particular candidate, individuals and organizations can also assist
candidates indirectly through contributions to state and national political parties for
"party-building" activities which include general party mailings or general thematic ad
vertising that is not specific to a particular candidate. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(l )(B)
(1994) (placing a $20,000 cap on individual donations to national parties in a given
year); 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(2)(B) (1994) (limiting PACs to $15,000 in contributions to
national parties in a given year). In reality, this party-building money allows the state
and national parties to offset expenditures that individual candidates would otherwise
have to incur, such as get-out-the-vote efforts, general thematic mailings, telephone
calls, and field staff. See STERN, supra note 2, at 165.
26. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44 n.52.
27. See Faucher, 928 F.2d at 471-72; see also infra section I.B.1 (discussing the
magic words approach). The Ninth Circuit coined the phrase "magic words" in describ
ing a strict interpretation of the express advocacy standard. See FEC v. Furgatch, 807
F.2d 857, 863 (9th Cir. 1987).
28. See 928 F.2d at 471-72.

692

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 95:686

The FEC recently adopted a more context-based approach29 that
codifies an earlier Ninth Circuit decision allowing the FEC to regulate a
broader spectrum of campaign-related speech.3 0 The FEC and the Ninth
Circuit look to the communication as a whole and consider its timing
and other "external factors that contribute to a complete understanding
of [the] speech" to determine whether the communication is so clearly
unambiguous that reasonable people could not differ as to its meaning,
that is, whether the communication advocates for or against a clearly
identified candidate.31 This approach, the FEC and the Ninth Circuit
contend, avoids the rigidity of the "magic words" standard and there
fore potentially covers a broader and more appropriate range of speech.
To appreciate the difference in these two approaches, consider two
hypothetical examples of independent expenditure advertising seen dur
ing a given campaign season. In the first example, the National Rifle
Association32 runs an advertisement on November 2, three days before
the general election. The television screen opens with a large caption
"Don't let Bill do it to us again!" against a screen-size picture of Presi
dent Clinton. The advertisement makes several comments about the
President's campaign tactics and ends with a rousing message: "We
have a right to own guns to protect ourselves. We have an opportunity
three days from now to stop Bill Clinton from taking them away from
us." The second hypothetical advertisement is exactly the same, but
ends instead with the message, "Vote Against Bill Clinton."
Both advertisements would be covered by the new FEC regulations
because, based on their context, they unambiguously advocate the de
feat of a clearly identified candidate. However, because the first adver
tisement does not contain any of the magic words encouraging a voter
to "vote against" President Clinton, the First Circuit would rule that
this advertisement fails to clearly cross the threshold that divides issue

29. See 11 C.F.R. § 100.22 (1996); see also infra section I.B.2 (discussing the
context-sensitive approach). Congress has provided the FEC with original jurisdiction
over civil enforcement ofFECA, see 2 U.S.C. § 437c(b)(l) (1994), and the power to in
itiate enforcement of the FECA. See 2 U.S.C. § 437d(a)(6) (1994). The FEC is subject
to judicial review; however, courts give the FEC great deference because Congress gave
the FEC authority to enforce the FECA's provisions. See FEC v. Democratic Senatorial
Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 37 (1981); Orloski v. FEC, 795 F.2d 156, 164 (D.C.
Cir. 1986). Naturally, FEC decisions must be in accord with relevant court holdings.
See Orloski, 195 F.2d at 166-67.
30. See Furgatch, 807 F.2d 857.
31. See 807 F.2d at 864.
32. The National Rifle Association spent $720,000 in the 1994 congressional
races, which brought the Republican party control of both houses of Congress for the
first time since 1946. See John J. Fialka, NRA Support for House GOP Freshmen Pays
Off, But Lawmakers Worry About Reformer Image, WALL ST. J., June 20, 1995, at A20.
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advocacy (here, the right to own guns) from express advocacy (here,
advocating the defeat of candidate Clinton).33 Thus, the First Circuit
would hold that it falls beyond the reach of the FEC's authority to regu
late elections.
This Note contends that there is no justifiable distinction between
advertisements like the two examples above: both should be construed
as

independent expenditures that can be regulated through reporting and

disclosure requirements by the FEC. This Note therefore argues that the
contextual approach of the new FEC regulations fully complies with

Buckley's definition of express advocacy. The contextual approach ade
quately protects the First Amendment rights of the parties involved
while allowing the government to meet its compelling interests in fully
informing the electorate and rooting out and deterring ftbuse in the elec
toral process.
In order to demonstrate the constitutionality of the new FEC regu
lations, it is important to have a clear understanding of the rationale for
the express advocacy standard. To this end, Part I describes the Su
preme Court's development of the standard in Buckley v. Valeo and its
progeny. It then details the resulting split between the federal circuits
regarding the modem definition of "express advocacy" and the consti
tutionality of the FEC's new regulations. Part II argues that the new
regulations comply with Buckley and its progeny by balancing the First
Amendment rights of individuals and groups against the compelling
governmental interest in regulating independent expenditures and corpq
rate contributions in federal elections.
I.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EXPRESS ADVOCACY STANDARD
In 1973, in the wake of the Watergate scandal and in response to

the actual and perceived corrupting influence of money in eie·ctions,
Congress passed its most comprehensive attempt to regulate the role of
money in federal elections by amending the FECA.34 In addition to cap
ping direct contributions35 and independent expenditures,36 the amend
ments required candidates, individuals, and groups to disclose both di-

33. See Faucher v. FEC, 928 F.2d 468, 472 (1st Cir. 1991).
34. See Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443,
88 Stat 1263; see also Daniel M. Gillen, Buckley v. Valeo: Federal Election Campaign
Reform at the Expense of First Amendment Rights, 4 Omo N.U. L. REv. 77 (1977) (de
tailing the history and legislative intent behind FECA).
35. See supra note 22.
36. See 18 U.S.C. § 608(e) (Supp. V 1975) (repealed 1976).
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rect contributions3 7 and independent expenditures to the FEC. For

independent expenditures, individuals or groups making such expendi
tures must register with the FEC and periodically disclose in their re
ports to the FEC the expenditures they have made.3 8
The Supreme Court in Buckley considered the constitutionality of
these provisions. The Court first established that money spent in cam
paigns is virtually equivalent to speech and, therefore, the regulation of
money in campaigns was equated with regulating speech.3 9 The Court
also determined that the FECA regulated First Amendment associational
rights through its requirements that political associations register and re
port their independent expenditures.40 Such reporting requirements
might deter some individuals or groups from participating in an associa
tion if they knew. their support would be disclosed to the public. Thus,
because the FECA regulated a fundamental right,41 the Court required
the governmental to show that the restrictions were narrowly tailored to
further a compelling governmental interest. 4 2
After upholding the cap o n direct contributions 43 - finding that it
furthered a compelling governmental interest in deterring the potential
for contributors "to purchase political favors from candidates, resulting
in the corruption of the political process"4 4 - the Court turned its at
tention to the FECA's regulation of independent expenditures. The

37. The reporting and disclosing requirements for direct contributions require a
candidate to periodically report the amount of money spent by the campaign and on
what that money was spent See 2 U.S.C. §§ 432(f), 434(a), 438(a)(4) (1994). In addi
tion, the campaign must report the name and occupation of any contributor who contrib
utes in excess of $200 in aggregate to the campaign. See 2 U.S.C. § 434(b) (1994).
38. See supra note 7.
39. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
40. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 22 (1976) (per curiam); see also LAURENCE
H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 13-31, at 1151-52 (2d ed. 1988) (de
tailing the associational concerns accompanying reporting requirements).
41. The Court noted that "[t]he restrictions, while neutral as to the ideas ex
pressed, limit political expression 'at the core of our electoral process and of the First
Amendment freedoms.' " 424 U.S. at 39 (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32
(1968)).
42. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 40-44, 64; see also TRIBE, supra note 40, § 12-2, at
791 (defining strict scrutiny review as a balancing test between a compelling govern
mental interest and the free speech interests, but weighted in favor of free speech to re
flect its constitutional importance). In order for a statute to survive strict scrutiny re
view, the Court must find (1) that the act addresses a compelling governmental interest
and (2) that the restrictions abridge that fundamental right only to a reasonably minimal
degree as is essential to advancing that governmental interest. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at
40-44, 64; see also TRIBE, supra note 40, § 12-2, at 791.
43. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27.
44. Allison Rittenhouse Hayward, Stalking the Elusive Express Advocacy Stan
dard, 10 J.L. & PoL. 51, 59 (1993) (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27).
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Court expressed concern that the independent expenditure provisions, as
drafted, threatened to improperly infringe on - or chill - the exercise
of First Amendment free speech rights.45 If an individual feared she
would receive a criminal fine46 for speaking her mind and not reporting
the expenditure to the FEC, the Court reasoned, she might refrain from
exercising the very political speech that forms the core of the First
Amendment.47 The Court therefore restricted the reach of the indepen
dent expenditure provisions to instances of "express advocacy."48
This Part describes the Court's development of the express advo
cacy standard and how lower courts have interpreted it as they attempt
to strike a balance between First Amendment rights and the compelling
government interest at stake. Section I.A describes the Court's estab
lishment of the express advocacy standard and discusses the Court's
narrow construction of the PECA based on the vagueness of the origi
nal language of the Act. Section I.B presents and analyzes the different
approaches taken by the federal appellate courts in applying the express
advocacy standard - the standard of the new FEC regulations - and
the way the new standard has been treated by the one lower federal
court that has heard a case based on the new FEC regulations.
A.

The Establishment of the Express Advocacy Standard

The Buckley Court's establishment of the express advocacy stan
dard was a response to what the Court felt was the vagueness of the
Act's independent expenditure provisions. This section describes the

Buckley Court's concern over the amended FECA's language regulating
independent expenditures and explains how the Court narrowed the ap
plication of these regulations. It also describes the Buckley Court's ap
plication of strict scrutiny review to these provisions and discusses how
the Court elaborated on the express advocacy standard in FEC v.

Massachusetts Citizens for Life. 49
1.

The Vagueness Problem

Although the Court had upheld the FECA's caps on direct contri
butions, it was particularly concerned by the FECA's language regulat
ing independent expenditures because it applied anytime an individual
or corporation spent money "relative to a clearly identified candidate,"

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 41.
See 2 U.S.C. § 437g(d) (1994).
See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 41 n.48.
See 424 U.S. at 44, 81-82.
479 U.S. 238 (1986).
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that was not coordinated with any campaign. 50 The Court believed that
such a definition was excessively vague; that is, the definition did not
give sufficiently clear warning of the proscribed conduct. 15 A statute
that is excessively vague violates due process for three principle rea
sons. First, vague laws risk "trap [ping] the innocent by not providing
fair warning." 25 Second, they "foster 'arbitrary and discriminatory ap
plication' " of the law. 35 Finally, they have a chilling effect on a funda
mental right, "inducing 'citizens to " 'steer far wider of the unlawful
zone' . . . than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly
marked." ' " 45
In order to salvage the constitutionality of the Act, 55the Court in
terpreted the language regarding independent expenditures to apply only

50. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39-42, 80-81. The original disclosure provisions for
independent expenditures covered any expenditures made "for the purpose of
influ
encing" the nomination or election of candidates to federal office. See 2 U.S.C. § 431(t)
(Supp. V 1975) (amended 1980) (defining expenditure); 2 U.S.C. § 434(e) (Supp. V
1975) (amended 1980) (requiring reporting to the FEC). The original provision placing
a cap on independent expenditures contained similar language. At the time of Buckley,
18 U.S.C. § 608(e)(l) prohibited any person from making "any expenditure . . . relative
to a clearly identified candidate during a calendar year which, when added to all other
expenditures made by such person during the year advocating the election or defeat of
such candidate, exceeds $1,000." Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39 (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 608(e)( l ) (Supp. IV 1974)). The Court limited the regulations' definition of expendi
tures spent "relative to a clearly identified candidate" to communications that "ex
pressly advocate" for or against a clearly identified candidate. See 424 U.S. at 44. The
FECA has now encompassed the Court's approach by defining an independent expendi
ture as "an expenditure by a person expressly advocating the election or defeat of a
clearly identified candidate." 2 U.S.C. § 431(17) (1994).
51. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 41-42, 80-81. In addition to being considered under
the vagueness doctrine, the independent expenditure provisions could be challenged as
overbroad. Both doctrines attempt to prevent the chilling of otherwise protected speech.
See International Union of Police Assns. Local 189 v. Barrett, 524 F. Supp. 760, 765
(N.D. Ga. 1981) (overbreadth and vagueness are two separate concepts that often go
hand in hand); ROTUNDA ET AL., supra note 16, § 16.9 at 846; cf. Note, The Void for
Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 67, 110-113 (1960)
(claiming that the voi4 for vagueness and overbreadth doctrines are indistinguishable).
Therefore, many of the same reasons that this Note submits to defend the new regula
tions from attack on vagueness grounds also apply to the overbreadth issue.
52. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 41 n.48 (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S.
104, 108-09 (1972)).
53. 424 U.S. at 41 n.48 (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 10809 (1972)).
54. 424 U.S. at 41 n.48 (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109
(1972) (quoting Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964) (quoting Speiser v.
Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)))).
55. See 424 U.S. at 44; see also Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast
Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (discussing the Court's pref
erence for finding a constitutionally acceptable construction of a statute over an inter
pretation that would make the statute unconstitutional).
• • .
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when the message clearly identified a specific candidate and expressly
advocated for or against that candidate.56 The Court added in a footnote
that "[t]his construction would restrict the application of [the Act] to
communications containing express words of advocacy of election or
defeat, such as 'vote for,' 'elect,' 'support,' 'cast your ballot for,'
'Smith for Congress,' 'vote against,' 'defeat,' 'reject.' "57 The Court de
termined that this more narrow definition would be clear enough to al
low the FEC to regulate speech which expressly advocates for or
against an identified candidate in an election while preventing the chil
ling of political speech aimed at advocating issues.58
The Court's stated intention in adopting the express advocacy stan
dard was to limit the FECA's application to only those independent ex
penditures which "unambiguously related to the campaign of a particu
lar federal candidate."59 This approach respected "issue advocacy,''
which the First Amendment protects.60

2.

Applying Strict Scrutiny

The Buckley Court applied strict scrutiny because the PECA regu
lates fundamental rights, in this case both the right to free speech and
the right to free association.61 This standard of review requires the gov
ernment to show a compelling interest for the measure and that the
measure is narrowly tailored to meet this compelling interest.62
Having narrowed the definition of independent expenditure to pro
tect issue advocacy and to satisfy the vagueness doctrine,63 the Court
considered whether the government had a compelling interest in regu
lating independent expenditures. The Court first determined that the
government lacked a compelling interest to impose a ceiling on inde
pendent expenditures that limited the amount of money any one person
or group may independently spend "relative to a particular candi
date. "64 While the Court determined that the government did have an
interest in imposing a ceiling on large direct campaign contributions

56. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 41-44, 80.
57. 424 U.S. at 44 n.52 (emphasis added).
58. See 424 U.S. at 82.
59. 424 U.S. at 80.
60. See 424 U.S. at 79.
61. See 424 U.S. at 14-23; see also supra notes 13, 40-42 and accompanying text.
62. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
63. See supra section l.A.1.
64. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27, 46-48 (evaluating 18 U.S.C. § 608(e)(l) (Supp. IV
1974)). It should be noted that when a candidate (or her campaign committee) coordi
nates or controls the otherwise independent expenditure, it is treated by the FEC as a
contribution. See 2 U.S.C. § 431(17) (1994); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46-47.
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that could lead to political corruption through the purchase of political
favors, it stated that "independent advocacy . . . [did] not presently ap

pear to pose dangers of real or apparent corruption comparable to
those identified with large campaign contributions."65 The Court felt the
candidate's lack of control over any aspect of an independent expendi
ture undermined its value, and therefore posed little threat of a quid pro
quo between the candidate and the individual or group doing the
spending.66
Nonetheless, the Court then recognized three valid compelling
governmental interests behind the FECA's reporting and disclosure re
quirements and therefore upheld them as constitutional. 67 First, inform
ing the electorate about the source of political campaign money aids
voters in evaluating candidates. 68 Providing information about candi
dates' financial supporters and opponents allows voters to "place each
candidate in the political spectrum more precisely than" they could if
they were merely relying on party affiliation or the campaign advertise
ments paid for directly by a candidate. 69 Second, by exposing indepen
dent expenditures to public scrutiny, disclosure and reporting aids in de
terring corruption and avoiding the appearance of corruption. 7 0 Third,

65. 424 U.S. at 46 (emphasis added). Since Buckley, the role of independent ex
penditures in elections has vastly changed. See supra note 23 and accompanying text;
State ex rel. WMC Issues Mobilization Council, Inc. v. Circuit Court for Dane County,
No. 96-3133-W, at 10 (Wis. Ct App. Nov. 8, 1996) (opinion supplementing order of
Nov. 1, 1996) {upholding a temporary injunction of unreported independent expendi
tures Ul).der a state law similar to the FECA and noting that "[t]he role of advertising in
political campaigns has changed dramatically in the twenty years since Buckley").
66. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46-47.
67. See 424 U.S. at 64-68, 80-81. Some have criticized the majority opinion for
holding that the reporting requirements survived strict scrutiny without ever directly
stating in the text that the Court reached the question of whether the disclosure and re
porting requirements were narrowly tailored. See 424 U.S. at 236-41 (Burger, CJ., dis
senting); see also Gillen, supra note 34, at 80, 86-89 (criticizing the Court's lack of a
narrowness scrutiny of the infringement of associational rights).
It should also be noted that, despite the compelling governmental interests underly
ing the FECA's reporting and disclosure requirements, the Court indicated that the FEC
should not require disclosure if it would result in threats and harassment of disclosed
contributors. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 74.
68. See 424 U.S. at 66-67.
69. 424 U.S. at 67.
70. See 424 U.S. at 67. As Justice Louis Brandeis wrote: "Publicity is justly com
mended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of
disinfectants." LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY 92 (Frederick A.
Stokes Co. 1914), quoted in Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67. The Buckley Court agreed and
noted that an " 'informed public opinion is the most potent of all restraints upon mis
government' " 424 U.S. at 67 n.79 (quoting Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S.
233, 250 (1936)); see also David K. Neidert, Comment, Campaign Reform: Fifteen
Years After Buckley v. Valeo, 17 J. CoNTEMP. L. 289, 298-300 (1991) (indicating the
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the reporting and disclosure requirements aid the government in gather
ing information to detect violations of the contribution limits.71

3.

MCFL: Elaboration of the Standard

In 1986, ten years after Buckley, the Court reiterated its express
advocacy standard in FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life12 and indi
cated that it would look to the whole communication to determine if it
met the definition of express advocacy - rather than simply consider
ing whether or not the communication contained a direct message such
as "Vote for Smith. "73 The mere fact that the communication in ques
tion was "less direct . . . d[id] not change its essential nature"as a
communication meeting the definition of express advocacy. 74

In MCFL, a nonprofit corporation had compiled a "pro-life"vot
ing record sheet for the state and federal candidates in Massachusetts'
primary election and published this record in a "Special Edition"of the
organization's newsletter, which was distributed to the organization's
membership as well as to the general public. 75 The "score sheet"identi
fied candidates as either agreeing or disagreeing with the organization's
pro-life views and included photographs of certain pro-life candidates,
"admonish[ing] that '[n]o pro-life candidate can win in November
without your vote in September.' "76 On the back page of the newslet
ter, in large bold-faced letters, was the phrase "VOTE PRO-LIFE."77

importance of disclosure requirements to inform the public and to enforce federal elec
tion laws). But cf. Mcintyre v. Ohio Elections Commn., 115 S. Ct. 1511 (1995) (holding
unconstitutional an Ohio statute that prohibited the distribution of campaign literature
that does not contain the name and address of the person or campaign official issuing
the literature).
71. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67-68; see also Goland v. United States, 903 F.2d
1247, 1251 (9th Cir. 1990).
72. 479 U.S. 238 (1986) [hereinafter MCFL].
73. See 419 U.S. at 249.
74. 479 U.S. at 249 (emphasis added). The Court also held that the communication
reached beyond the corporation's "restricted class," which is prohibited by § 44lb. See
479 U.S. at 250. A corporation may use general, i.e. unsegregated, funds to communi
cate a message containing express advocacy if it only goes to the corporation's re
stricted class, see 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2) (1994), which includes "(1) communication by
the corporation to its stockholders, executive and administrative personnel, and their
families; (2) voter registration by the corporation of these individuals and their families;
and (3) solicitation for voluntary contributions, to the corporation's separate, segregated
fund (or PAC)." Hayward, supra note 44, at 64 n.100 (citing 2 U.S.C. § 44lb(b)(2)
(1988)).
75. See MCFL, 479 U.S. at 243-44.
76. 479 ·u.s. at 243.
77. 479 U.S. at 243.
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The publication also included a disclaimer: "This special election edi
tion does not represent an endorsement of any particular candidate."78
Despite the disclaimer, the Court emphasized that the publication
urged voters to vote for pro-life candidates and identified specific pro
life candidates with photographs.79 The fact that the publication's exhor
tation was "less direct than 'Vote for Smith' [did] not change its essen

tial nature."80 The publication "provide[d] in effect an explicit direc
tive: vote for these (named) candidates."81 Thus the publication went
"beyond issue discussion to express electoral advocacy."82
B.

The Modern Conflict Over Express Advocacy

Despite Buckley's exhaustive 294-page treatment of the issues sur
rounding the FECA, the Court spent relatively little time discussing the
express advocacy standard. The Court's decision in MCFL also appears
to have done little to define more c�early what the Court meant by "ex
press advocacy." Perhaps as a result, the Courts of Appeals and the
FEC have differed over application of the phrase. Section l.B.1 dis
cusses the strict interpretation of the express advocacy which looks only
for the magic words or their synonyms.83 Section I.B.2 explains the new
FEC regulations' context-sensitive approach, which essentially codifies
the approach applied by the Ninth Circuit.84 Finally, section I.B.3 exam-

78. 479 U.S. at 243.
79. See 479 U.S. at 249.
80. 479 U.S. at 249 (emphasis added).
81. 479 U.S. at 249 (emphasis added).
82. 479 U.S. at 249.
83. See Faucher v. FEC, 928 F.2d 468 (1st Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., FEC v.
Keefer, 502 U.S. 820 (1991).
84. See FEC v. Furgatch, 807 F.2d 857 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 850
(1987). Other circuits have heard cases that deal with interpreting the express advocacy
standard, but it is unclear whether these courts look only for the magic words, or look
more broadly to the context to find an unambiguous statement of advocacy. See, e.g.,
FEC v. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 59 F.3d 1015 (10th Cir. 1995),
revd. on other grounds, 116 S. Ct. 2309 (1996); FEC v. Central Long Island Tax Re
form Immediately Comm., 616 F.2d 45, 50-53 (2d Cir. 1980) [hereinafter CLATRIM]
(holding an organization's mailer, containing voting records of a member of Congress
and reading "never forget that since you are paying the tax bills, you are the boss. And
don't ever let your Representative forget it!" did not constitute express advocacy); FEC
v. Christian Action Network, 894 F. Supp. 946, 958 (W.D. Va. 1995) (holding that
Buckley created a bright-line rule); FEC v. American Fed. of State, County & Mun. Em
ployees, 471 F. Supp. 315 (D.D.C. 1979) (holding a poster depicting President Gerald
Ford wearing a button reading "Pardon Me" and embracing President Richard Nixon
did not constitute express advocacy). In CLATRIM, the Second Circuit based its holding
on the fact that the communication before it made "no reference anywhere ... to the
congressman's party, to whether he is running for re-election, to the existence of an
election or the act of voting in any election; nor is there anything approaching an unam-
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ines the holding of the one federal court to hear a case involving the
constitutionality of the new regulations.

1.

The Magic Words Approach

The First Circuit follows a literal, or magic words, approach to

Buckley's express advocacy standard, under which a court looks only to
the communication itself for express terms that advocate for or against
a clearly identified candidate.85 Absent such phrases as " vote for,"
"elect," "support," "cast your ballot for," " Smith for Congress,"
"vote against," "defeat," and "reject," the court will not find the com
munication to be express advocacy regardless of the context of the
communication.86

In Faucher v. FEC the First Circuit determined that a voter guide
,

produced and distributed by a nonprofit corporation did not constitute
express advocacy. The guide in question was entitled "November Elec
tion Issue 1988!," with the subheading " Federal & State Candidate
Surveys Enclosed - Take-along Issue for Election Day!" The guide in
cluded candidate and party positions on pro-life issues and indicated
that a "yes" response meant the candidate or party agreed with the Na
tional Right to Life's position on the issue. The guide also contained a
disclaimer, noting that the publication did not represent an endorsement
of any candidate by the organization.87The court held that the voter
guide was not express advocacy for or against a specifically identified
candidate, reasoning that Buckley had adopted a bright-line test to deter
mine whether a communication constituted discussion of issues or dis
cussion of candidates.8
8The court did not discuss MCFL's language re-

biguous statement in favor of or against the election of [the c]ongressman." CLATRIM,
616 F.2d at 53.
Thi Tenth Circuit may have looked favorably on the "bright-line" approach in
Colorado Republican when it declined to reverse a district court finding of no "express
advocacy" in the advertisements paid for by the Colorado Republican Party targeting
then U.S. Senator Tim Wirth. Instead, the court held that § 441a(d)(3) applied to all co
ordinated spending involving a clearly identified candidate "without regard to whether
that message constitutes express advocacy." See Colorado Republican, 59 F.3d at 1022.
The district court had stated that it was adopting the "bright-line test," relying on
Faucher, but it also cited Furgatch several times for support of its express advocacy
standard without mentioning any distinction between the two approaches. See FEC v.
Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 839 F. Supp. 1448, 1455-56 (D. Colo.
1993).
85. See, e.g., Faucher, 928 F.2d at 410-72.
86. 928 F.2d at 470 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 & n.52 (1976) (per
curiam)).
87. See 928 F.2d at 469.
88. See 928 F.2d at 471.
·
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garding a "less direct" 8 9 message· of advocacy or the "essential nature"
of the communication. 9 0 The court cited MCFL solely for the proposi
tion that the Supreme Court requires the express advocacy standard to
be met.91 The words "vote for " were present in the communication in
question in MCFL, even if they did not precede a candidate's name or
picture, and the First Circuit apparently presumed that this meant the
magi� words test had been met.
The Faucher court based its reliance on the magic words test on
the difficulty of interpreting the meaning and effects of words. 9 2 The
court reasoned that relying on how others interpret a communication to
determine the communication's meaning would put a speaker "wholly
at the mercy of the varied understanding of his hearers and conse
quently of whatever inferences may be drawn to his intent and mean
ing. " 39 In political speech, insinuation has become an art form. Some

one could always interpret a political message as advocating the defeat
or election of a particular candidate. Hence, the court contended, any
standard beyond explicit language must be unconstitutionally vague.

2.

The New FEC Context-Sensitive Approach To Express Advocacy
The new FEC regulations adopt a more context-sensitive approach

to determining whether a communication contains express advocacy, es
sentially codifying the holding of the Ninth Circuit in FEC v. Furgatch.
Under the new regulations, a communication that is directed at a clearly
identified candidate 9 4 can constitute express advocacy in either of two
ways. First, the communication is express advocacy if it contains a par-

89. See FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens For Life, 479 U.S. 238, 249 (1986).
90. See 479 U.S. at 249.
91. See Faucher, 928 F.2d at 470 (citing MCFL, 479 U.S. at 249).
92. See 928 F.2d at 471.
93. 928 F.2d at 471 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 43 (1976) (per curiam)
(quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 535 (1945))).
94. In order for a communication to qualify as express advocacy it must pass the
initial hurdle of being directed at a clearly identified candidate. See 11 C.F.R. § 100.16
(1996). If the communication is not directed at a clearly identified candidate, it will not
be express advocacy regardless of the context of the communication or whether it con
tains any of the magic words. See 11 C.F.R. § 100.16 (1996). Candidates are considered
to be "clearly identified" when the communication clearly identifies the candidate by
name, nickname, photograph or drawing. See 11 C.F.R. § 100.17 (1996). A candidate
may also be clearly identified by an unambiguous reference to his or her status, such as
"the President," "the incumbent," or "the Democratic presidential nominee." 11
C.F.R. § 100.17 (1996).
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ticular phrase from a list of phrases based on the magic words in

Buckley.95 Second, the communication constitutes express advocacy if,
[w]hen taken as a whole and with limited reference to external events,
such as the proximity to the election, [it] could only be interpreted by a
reasonable person as containing advocacy of the election or defeat of one
or more clearly identified candidate(s) because - (1) [t]he electoral por
tion of the communication is unmistakable, unambiguous, and suggestive
of only one meaning; and

(2)

[r]easonable minds could not differ as to

whether it encourages actions to elect or defeat one or more clearly iden
tified candidate(s) or encourages some other kind of action.96

The distinction between the new regulations and the approach of the
First Circuit in Faucher97 is that the FEC does not halt the search for
express advocacy after looking for the magic words. Under the new
regulations, the FEC, or the court, also examines the communication as
a whole and considers such factors as when and where the communica
tion takes place.9s

95. See 11 C.F.R. § 100.22(a) (1996). The list of phrases includes "phrases such
as 'vote for the President,' 're-elect your Congressman,' 'support the Democratic nomi
nee,' . . . 'Smith for Congress,' . . . 'defeat' accompanied by a picture of one or more
candidate{s), 'reject the incumbent.' " 11 C.F.R. § 100.22(a) (1996). A phrase such as
" 'vote Pro-Life' or 'vote Pro-Choice' accompanied by a listing of clearly identified
candidates described as Pro-Life or Pro-Choice" also constitutes express advocacy. 11
C.F.R. § 100.22(a) (1996).
96. 11 C.F.R. § 100.22(b) (1996).
Additionally, under the new approach communications that contain both issue ad
vocacy and express electoral advocacy are treated as "express advocacy." 60 Fed. Reg.
35,292, 35,295 (1995). This approach is consistent with Buckley, which protected only
strict issue advocacy. See supra notes 12, 33 and accompanying text (discussing the dis
tinction between communications that contain strict issue advocacy and communications
which also advocate the election or defeat of a particular candidate). It is also clearly
warranted. Otherwise, the FECA's requirements could easily be avoided by simply ad
ding some minimal issue-based call to action into every independent expenditure com
munication while still clearly advocating for or against a candidate - having the same
impact on elections and presenting the same problems that the FECA was designed to
solve.
97. See supra text accompanying notes 85-93.
98. For example, a court might be more inclined to find express advocacy if a par
ticular communication is made three days before the election, than if it were made three
years before an election.
The FEC considered imposing a strict time period for communications that dis
cussed a candidate's character, qualifications or accomplishments, but did not include
one of the magic phrases. See 60 Fed. Reg. 35,292, 35,295 (1995). If such a communi
cation was made within a set number of days before an election, and "did not en
courage any type of action on any specific issue," then the communication would be
treated as express advocacy. Id. at 35,295. The FEC rejected this approach in part on
the grounds that it "should be further limited to avoid" impinging on the First Amend
ment considerations involved. Id. at 35,294. Under the new FEC regulations there is no
set time period in which certain communications are treated as express advocacy.
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In Furgatch the Ninth Circuit rejected a strictly construed bright
line standard for express advocacy.99 The court applied a more context
sensitive interpretation of Buckley's express advocacy standard 100 that
asked whether the communication, "when read as a whole, and with
limited reference to external events, [is] susceptible of no other reasona
ble interpretation but as an exhortation to vote for or against a specific
candidate."1 0 1

In Furgatch, the FEC brought suit against Harvey Furgatch for
failure to report his independent expenditures and for not including a
disclaimer in his advertisements during the 1980 Presidential election. 1 02
Furgatch had run an advertisement in the New York 'limes and the Bos

ton Globe entitled "Don't Let Him Do It" which discussed President
Jimmy Carter and gave examples of how the sponsor thought Carter
was "degrading the electoral process and lessening the prestige of the
office" of the President.1 03 The advertisement in the New York 'limes
ran

one week before the general election; the Boston Globe ad ran three

days before the election. 1 0 4
The Ninth Circuit found Furgatch's advertisements to be a form of
express advocacy against an identified candidate, 1 0 5reasoning that "ex
press advocacy" was not strictly limited to a bright-line test of whether
a communication used certain key phrases.106 It argued that to require
that the communication use some "magic words" or a perfect synonym

One commentator, Allison Rittenhouse Hayward, rejects the contextual approach.
See Hayward, supra note 44, at 86-88. Hayward proposes, instead, that if a communica
tion is made within a five-day window prior to the election and mentions a specific can
didate it automatically would be considered express advocacy. See id. at 86-94. She
adopts the five-day period to mitigate the impact of last-minute negative independent
expenditures to which the targeted side has no opportunity (or limited opportunity) to
respond. See id. at 92-93. However, it is hard to justify a strict window approach while
rejecting all contextual considerations. If we can look to the time of the communication
at all, what is essential about the five-day limit? People can just as effectively run nega
tive advertisements that can destroy a campaign six or ten days or even two weeks prior
to an election.
99. See FEC v. Furgatch, 807 F.2d 857, 860 (9th Cir. 1987).
100. See 807 F.2d at 863.
101. 807 F.2d at 864. It should be noted that Furgatch was argued and the opinion
was submitted, but not filed, prior to the Supreme Court's decision in FEC v. MCFL,
479 U.S. 238 (1986).
102. See Furgatch, 807 F.2d at 859.
103. 807 F.2d at 858 (quoting Don't Let Him Do It, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1980, at
A29 (advertisement)).
104. See 807 F.2d at 858 (referring to the advertisement that ran in the Boston
Globe on Nov. 1, 1980).
105. See 807 F.2d at 864-65.
106. See 807 F.2d at 862-63.
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of the words highlighted as examples in Buckley would destroy the ef
fectiveness of the FECA.107
The Ninth Circuit instead established a standard that looks to the
context of the communication to determine whether it meets Buckley's
express advocacy standard.108 The court held that despite the First Cir
cuit's rejection of anything but a bright-line test,109 there was nothing in

Buckley to suggest that the magic words test is the only way to survive
the vagueness doctrine. The court reasoned that the Buckley express ad
vocacy standard was intended to eliminate vague statutory language as
well as to balance the important Congressional policy objectives and the
First Amendment interests involved.110
Because traditional First Amendment doctrine recognizes "that
words take part of their meaning and effect from the environment in
which they are spoken," the Furgatch court concluded that context
should be a relevant, but ancillary, consideration under the express ad
vocacy standard for determining the meaning of the communication.111
In other words, the Court recognized that words derive part of their
meaning from the context in which they are communicated. A political
advertisement may clearly advocate the election or defeat of a particular
candidate despite the fact that it does not contain one of the magic
words. Its meaning can be unambiguously derived from the context of
the communication.

3.

The New Regulations and the Courts

The issue of the constitutionality of the new FEC regulations is
certain to divide the circuits. Because the regulations codify the Ninth
Circuit's approach, they will certainly be constitutional there. However,
as the only other court to hear the issue thus far demonstrates, courts
following the magic words approach will find no room in the Constitu
tion for the FEC's most recent interpretation of the express advocacy
standard.
Recently, in Maine Right to Life Committee, Inc. v. FEC,112 the
same federal district court that initially adopted the magic words ap-

107. See 807 F.2d at 863.
108. See 807 F.2d at 863-64.
109. See Faucher v. FEC, 928 F.2d 468, 471-72 (1st Cir. 1991).
110. See Furgatch, 807 F.2d at 862.
111. 807 F.2d at 863-64.
112. 914 F. Supp. 8 (D. Me. 1996) [hereinafter MRLC]. MRLC is a nonprofit
membership corporation that advocates against abortion rights. The corporation sought a
declaratory judgment that the FEC's new definition of express advocacy, designed to
carry out the FECA's prohibition of corporate financial support for independent expend-
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proach,1 13 later upheld .by the First Circuit in Faucher v. FEC, 114 held
the new FEC regulations unconstitutional. The court held that, because
the regulations reached communications that did not include the magic
words, the regulation was invalid as not authorized by the FECA, as in
terpreted by the Supreme Court and the First Circuit.115
Curiously, the court admitted that a communication derives part of
its meaning from the context in which it is delivered. In fact, the court
went as far as admitting that even Buckley called for some " [l]imited
reference to external events " because " [a]fter all, how does one know
that 'support' or 'defeat' means an election rather than an athletic con
test or some other event without considering the external context of a
federal election with specific candidates?" 11 6
The court also gave some indication that the regulations could sur
vive a constitutional challenge based on vagueness. In its early analysis
of the regulations, the court noted that the regulations "appear[] to be a
very reasonable attempt to deal with these vagaries of language and, in
deed, [are] drawn quite narrowly to deal with only the 'unmistakable'
and 'unambiguous,' cases where 'reasonable minds cannot differ' on
the message. " 1 17 The court, however, naturally followed the First Cir
cuit "bright-line" approach, maintaining that Buckley drew "a bright
line that may err on the side of permitting things that affect the election
process, but at all costs avoids restricting, in any way, discussion of

public issues. " 1 1 8
Il.

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE FEDERAL ELECTION

COMMISSION'S STANDARD
This Part argues that the new FEC regulations comply with the re
quirements of Buckley and provide the best means of enforcing FECA.
Section IT.A argues that the new regulations are consistent with the Su
preme Court's holding in Buckley and its clarification in MCFL. Section

itures, was unconstitutionally vague and the government should be enjoined from en
forcing it.
113. See Faucher v. FEC, 743 F. Supp. 64 (D. Me. 1990), affd., 928 F.2d 468 (1st
Cir. 1991).
1 14. 928 F.2d 468 (1st Cir. 1991).
1 1 5. See MRLC, 914 F. Supp. at 13.
116. 914 F. Supp. at 11 (quoting in part 11 C.F.R. § 100.22(b) (1996)).
117. 914 F. Supp. at 1 1 (quoting 1 1 C.F.R. § 100.22(b) (1996)).
118. 914 F. Supp. at 12. The court recognized that "[t]he result is not very satisfy
ing from a realistic communications point of view and does not give much recognition
to the policy of the election statute to keep corporate money from influencing elections
in this way, but it does recogiiize the First Amendment interest as the Court has defined
it." 914 F. Supp. at 12.
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11.B argues that the new approach enables the government to meet its
compelling interests behind the FECA's disclosure and reporting re
quirements for independent expenditures, and is narrowly tailored to
such ends. Finally, section II.C argues that the context-sensitive ap
proach is consistent with the Court's treatment of other areas of First
Amendment law.
A.

Why the New FEC Approach Complies with the Language of
Buckley and Its Progeny

This section argues that the new FEC regulations comply with the
Supreme Court's holdings in Buckley and its progeny. Section II.A.1
puts forth the argument that the new regulations comply with the exact
language used in Buckley and the later Supreme Court cases on this
subject, as well as traditional views on interpreting the meaning of a
communication. Section II.A.2 argues that the FEC regulations are a
constitutional and appropriate response to Buckley's main concern re
garding the independent expenditure provisions - that the original lan
guage of the Act was too vague and may be overbroad.
1.

Compliance with the Buckley Language and its Directive

The new FEC regulations comply with the Court's actual language

in Buckley. In order to avoid vagueness concerns, 119 the B uckley Court
limited the reach of the Act to independent expenditures that constitute
express advocacy and added, in a footnote, that express advocacy in
cludes words "such as" - implying that it is not limited to - the
magic words. As the court in Furgatch noted, however, Buckley did not
claim that use of these words was the only way a communication can
constitute express advocacy; this "short list of words . . . does not ex
haust the capacity of the English language to expressly advocate the

election or defeat of a candidate." 120

Additionally, the context in which the communication is made is
important for the simple reason that words derive part of their meaning

from the context in which they are used: 121 "Words are not pebbles in
119. See supra section I.A (discussing the vagueness doctrine).
120. FEC v. Furgatch, 807 F.2d 857, 863 (9th Cir. 1987).
121. See 807 F.2d at 863-64; MLRC, 914 F. Supp. at 11. As Professor Sunstein has
explained:
Some people think that the contextual character of meaning undermines the pro
ject of rule-following. But this is a mistake. "Bat" may mean one thing in con
nection with baseball and another thing in connection with a zoo, but the term,
taken in its context, may well be determinate, and its meaning need not depend
on a moral or political argument of any sort. The contextual character of meaning
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alien juxtaposition; they have only a communal existence; and not only
does the meaning of each interpenetrate the other, but all in their aggre
gate take their purport from the setting in which they are used." 122
Therefore, determining whether a communication constitutes express
advocacy actually requires looking, to some extent, at the context of the
communication.

2.

Avoiding the Trappings of the Vagueness Doctrine

The FEC's context-based approach, with its emphasis on clearly
unambiguous advocacy, protects the FECA from violating the vague
ness doctrine. The Buckley Court adopted an express advocacy standard
so that FECA could avoid the reach of the vagueness doctrine and over

breadth problems.1 23 But this does not mean that the magic words in
cluded in Buckley, "or their nearly perfect synonyms" 124 exhaust the
possibilities for finding either express advocacy or a constitutionally ac
ceptable requirement for disclosure and reporting of independent ex
penditures.125 The only relevant criterion in applying the express advo
cacy standard is that the independent expenditure must "unambiguously
relateO to the campaign of a particular federal candidate. " 1 26
Due process requires that criminal statutes, like the new regula
tions, 127 "provide adequate notice to a person of ordinary intelligence

warns us not to make "a fortress out of the dictionary," [Cabell v. Markham, 148
F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1945)], and thus to avoid mechanical reliance on diction
ary definitions when the context suggests that the dictionary meaning is not apt.
CASS R SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND PoLmCAL CONFLICT 123 (1996).
122. NLRB v. Federbush Co., 121 F.2d 954, 957 (2d Cir. 1941) (L. Hand, J.),
quoted in Shell Oil Co. v. Iowa Dept. of Rev., 488 U.S. 19, 25 n.6 (1988).
123. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. l, 43, 80 (1976) (per curiam). In narrowly
defining express advocacy, the Court also required that a candidate be "clearly identi
fied," that is, that "an explicit and unambiguous reference to the candidate appear as
part of the communication." 424 U.S. at 43.
124. Furgatch, 807 F.2d at 863.
125. See 807 F.2d at 863; State ex rel. WMC Issues Mobilization Council, Inc. v.
Circuit Court for Dane County, No. 96-3133-W, at 9-10 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov
. 8, 1996)
(opinion supplementing order of Nov
. l, 1996) (holding that Buckley did not establish a
bright-line rule, "particularly in view of its progeny, including Austin v. Michigan
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990)"). But see Faucher v. FEC, 928 F.2d 468,
472 (1st Cir
. 1991) (noting that Buckley adopted a bright-line test).
126. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 80; see also 424 U.S. at 41 n.48 (quoting Grayned v.
City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972) (quoting Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S.
360, 372 (1964) (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)))) (discussing
vagueness standard); TRIBE, supra note 40, § 12-31, at 1033-35 (summarizing void-for
vagueness standard); supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
127. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (discussing the criminal sanctions
and fines the FEC may impose for PECA violations).
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that his contemplated conduct is illegal." 128 When First A mendment
rights are involved the bar is raised even higher, requiring an even
"greater degree of specificity." 129 The Buckley Court feared that a
vague standard would chill speech of individuals intending to steer clear
of violations because a vague definition of express advocacy would
place a speaker " wholly at the mercy of the varied understanding of his
hearers."130 The new regulations require that the communication "could
only be interpreted by a reasonable person" as advocating the election
or defeat of a specific candidate.131 This standard insists that the com
munication is clear, specific and fully perceptible to any reasonable
person.
Some may argue that the FEC standard is itself vague, and thus the
threat of litigation will deter individuals from making communications,
even when the communication is ultimately found not to be in violation
of the A ct's requirements.132 A fter all, how are courts - or, more im
portantly, persons who wish to engage in strict issue advocacy but want
to avoid making independent expenditures that would bring them within
the reporting and disclosure requirements of the PECA - to determine
when no reasonable person could differ as to whether the communica
tion in question is advocating the election or defyat of a specific candi
date? There are two answers to this question. First, if the communica
tion is unambiguously electoral advocacy under the FEC regulations, a
person who doubts the communication is intended as electoral advocacy
must by definition be unreasonable. Second, and more important, the
Supreme Court has upheld other similar standards as not impermissibly
vague. For example, in obscenity cases the Court finds obscenity by
asking "whether to the average person, applying contemporary commu
nity standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole ap
peals to prurient interest." 133 A ny standard that requires that no reasona
ble minds could differ as to whether a communication is electoral
advocacy is at least as unambiguous as a standard that asks simply what
128. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 77 (citing United States v. Harris, 347 U.S. 612, 617
(1954)).
129. 424 U.S. at 77 (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1974)).
130. 424 U.S. at 43 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 535 (1945)).
131. 11 C.F.R. § 100.22(b) (1996).
132. See Maine Right to Life Committee v. FEC, 914 F. Supp. 8, 13 (D. Me.
1996) (arguing, in dicta, that because "what is issue advocacy a year before the election
may become express advocacy on the eve of the election and the speaker must continu
ally re-evaluate his or her words as the election approaches," the FEC's regulations
chill free speech in violation of the First Amendment); see also Faucher v. FEC, 928
F.2d 468, 471-7� (1st Cir. 1991) (expressing vagueness concerns regarding any approach beyond a bright-line rule).
133. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957).
·
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an average person would find when applying community standards.134

fu short, the new regulations are "drawn quite narrowly to deal with
only the 'unmistakable' and 'unambiguous' cases; " 135 they are therefore

essentially not vague by definition.13 6 By requiring that no reasonable
minds could differ, any party of reasonable intelligence should know

when they will be required to report and disclose the expenditure or, if
they are a for-profit corporation, when they are restricted from making
independent expenditures from their general treasury funds.137
Finally, the new regulations are not unconstitutionally overbroad.138

fu other words, the regulations do not "in attaining a permissible end,
unduly . . . infringe the protected freedom" of issue advocacy.139 A
regulation is overbroad if it reaches beyond speech that may be consti
tutionally regulated to cover speech or conduct which is protected by
the guarantees of free speech or free association.140 The Court in

Buckley upheld reporting and disclosure limitations on expenditures that
"unambiguously relateO " to advocacy for or against a particular candi
date.141 By requiring that reasonable minds could not differ over the fact
that the communication advocates for or against a candidate, the new
standard does not bring within its sweep constitutionally protected strict
issue advocacy.142

134. Some might argue that the obscenity standard is narrowed by relying on con
temporary community standards, see 354 U.S. at 489, and that this distinguishes the ob
scenity standard from the new FEC regulations. However, this argument neglects the
fact that the FEC regulations encompass a community standard as well, so long as the
community is made up of reasonable people. Thus, the FEC regulation arguably gives
even greater protection to those wishing to engage in free speech than the obscenity
standard. After all, the obscenity standard requires courts to apply the local community
standards, which may have a much more encompassing view of what constitutes ob
scenity than do communities elsewhere in the country. The FEC regulations mean, in ef
fect, that the potential speaker can rely on any reasonable person in the country to find
that the speech was not advocating for or against an identified candidate.
135. MLRC, 914 F. Supp. at 11.
136. This argument follows the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit in FEC v. Furgatch,
807 F.2d 857, 864 (9th Cir. 1987). See also MLRC, 914 F. Supp. at 11-12 (suggesting,
without reaching the issue, that the new regulations may provide an unambiguous stan
dard); supra text accompanying notes 116-18.
137. See supra note 7 (discussing the requirements for disclosure and reporting);
supra note 74 (discussing the prohibition on corporate expenditures from nonsegregated
accounts).
138. For a discussion of overbreadth, see supra note 51.
139. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940).
140. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940).
141. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 80 (1976) (per curiam); see also supra
note 59 and accompanying text
142. On the Buckley Court's concerns regarding the threat to First Amendment
rights from vague statutory or regulatory language, see supra notes 52-54 and accompa
nying text
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The Ability To Meet the Compelling Governmental Interests

When courts apply strict scrutiny review to a statute or regulation
that regulates a fundamental right, such as the freedom of speech or as
sociation, courts will uphold the statute or regulation only if there is a
compelling governmental interest for the measure, and the measure is
narrowly tailored to meet that interest.143 The FEC's standard satisfies
each of these requirements.

1.

Meeting the Compelling Governmental· Interests

In Buckley, the Court recognized three compelling governmental
interests behind the FECA's reporting and disclosure requirements: pro
viding information to the public to evaluate candidates, deterring actual
and apparent corruption, and gathering data for enforcement of cam
paign laws.144 In later cases, the Court recognized that the government
also has a compelling governmental interest in preventing corruption
and the appearance of corruption arising from for-profit corporate inde
pendent expenditures.145 These goals attempt to ensure an effective and
fair electoral system in our republic.146 In order to meet these goals, the
government must have a system that results in the disclosure and re
porting required by the Act, as well as the perception in the general
public's eye that these laws will be enforced. None of these goals is met
by the magic words approach because it can be so easily evaded.
The new FEC regulations give the government the ability to fur
ther its compelling interests embodied in the independent expenditure
requirements. Requiring disclosure keeps "the electorate fully informed
of the sources of campaign-directed speech and the possible connec
tions between the speaker and individual candidates."147 Information in
the form of an anonymous communication clearly sends a different
message from a communication that discloses the identity of the mes-

143. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (discussing the requirements of
strict scrutiny).
144. See Goland v. United States, 903 F.2d 1247, 1251 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66-68).
145. See FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens For Life, 479 U.S. 238, 256-60 (1986);
FEC v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 208 (1982).
146. See FEC v. Furgatch, 807 F.2d 857, 862 (9th Cir. 1987) (discussing the im
portance of a fully informed electorate and reducing corruption).
147. Furgatch, 807 F.2d at 862. The reporting and disclosure requirements also
serve a broader goal of preserving legitimate campaigns by enabling voters to make in
formed choices between candidates. See 807 F.2d at 862; Gardner, supra note 13, at
249-55 (criticizing Buckley's constitutional rulings on the FECA and urging a broader
·
governmental interest in preserving electoral legitimacy).
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senger.148 The Supreme Court has emphasized that this information al
lows the electorate to evaluate properly a candidate's ideology, inter
ests, and likely future performance - information crucial to selecting a
representative.149
Disclosure arid reporting also deter the exchange of campaign sup

port for political favors by subjecting this support to greater scrutiny.150
Those wishing to curry favor will be deterred by the fact that "all ex
penditures will be scrutinized by the

[FEC] and by the public for just

this sort of abuse." 151 Additionally, the FECA's disclosure and reporting
requirements further the First Amendment goal of ensuring that the
electorate has alf the necessary information to properly evaluate the

communication.152 Greater disclosure and reporting also means that the
government is better equipped to detect and deter corruption.153
Finally, the vast increase of such expenditures since the Buckley
ruling intensifies the need for a context-based approach.154 One reason

·

148. It is true that many organizations that finance independent expenditures select
names that may be misleading. For example, a communication by the Auto Dealers and
Drivers for Fair Trade was paid for by a foreign car dealership group. See Pianin, supra
note 5, at A19. However, the media and opposing candidates can use the reporting and
disclosure requirements to obtain the true identity of the organization and relay that to
the general public.
149. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66-67 (1976) (per curiam); see also
Furgatch, 807 F.2d at 862.
150. See First Natl. Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 792 n.32 (1978).
151. Mcintyre v. Ohio Elections Commn., 1 15 S. Ct 1511, 1523 (1995).
152. See Furgatch, 807 F.2d at 862.
153. See 807 F.2d at 862 (holding that a more comprehensive approach is needed
to ensure that the compelling interests are met).
Disclosure also allows the public a better opportunity to detect any "post-election
special favors that may be given in return" for financial support during the campaign.
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67.
The Supreme Court recently recognized that the definition of corruption can extend
beyond the mere quid pro quo of special political favors for cash. In Austin v. Michigan
State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), the Court upheld a Michigan statute
prohibiting corporations from using general treasury funds for independent expenditures
in state candidate elections, despite the infringement on the corporations' political
speech, because an unfair advantage may result from corporate-financed independent
expenditures. The Court reached this result because "[t]he resources in the treasury of a
business corporation . . . are not an indication of popular support for the corporation's
political ideas. They reflect instead the economically motivated decisions of investors
and customers." 494 U.S. at 659 (quoting Massachusetts Citizens For Life v. FEC, 479
U.S. 238, 257 (1986)). Therefore, the Court held that a legislature may attempt to con
trol the "corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are ac
cumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to
the public's support for the corporation's political ideas." 494 U.S. at 660.
154. The Furgatch court properly took note of this in 1987. See Furgatch, 807
F.2d at 862 (noting that independent expenditures have "become more widespread in
federal elections, and the need for controls more urgent").
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that the Buckley Court differentiated between independent expenditures
and contributions was that independent expenditures, at the time of

Buckley, did "not . . . appear to pose dangers of real or apparent corrup
tion comparable to those identified with large campaign contribu
tions." 155 The fact that independent expenditures play an immensely
more significant role in elections today156 places this issue in a different
light and makes the FEC's interest all the more compelling.157

2.

Narrow Tailoring

If courts applying strict scrutiny review find a compelling govern
mental interest for a given regulation, they next determine whether the
statute or regulation in question is narrowly drawn to meet that inter
est.158 There is no doubt that the "magic word" approach of the First
Circuit is more narrowly tailored than the context-sensitive approach
adopted by the FEC and the Ninth Circuit. However, that does not
mean that the context-sensitive approach fails the narrow fit test. What
the Court means by "narrowly tailored" is not that the government
must choose the least-restrictive means of achieving its objective. It
only means that the government's method must not be "substantially
broader than necessary to achieve the government's interest." 159
With the regulation of independent expenditures, courts attempt to
ensure that they do "not place burdens on the freedom of speech be
yond what is strictly necessary to further the purposes of the Act." 160 At
Another argument for the context-sensitive approach is that by taking into account
the timing of a communication, the new FEC approach also provides at least a small
amount of protection against last-minute independent expenditures. Frequently, last
minute independent expenditures fund the most negative type of campaign advertise
ments, which are often only tenuously supported by the record, and can have a signifi
cant impact on the election's outcome. See Robert Brett Dunham, Note and Comment,
Defoliating the Grassroots: Election Day Restrictions on Political Speech, 77 GEO. L.J.
2137, 2158 n.120 (1989); Ronald J. Ostrow, Walsh's Use of Weinberger Notes Assailed,
L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 4, 1992, at 4. By taking into account the timing of the communica
tion, the public can "learn the source behind these expenditures and will . . . receive
full information about a candidate's supporters and opponents." Hayward, supra note
44, at 60; see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66-67 (1976) (per curiam).
155. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46.
156. See supra note 23.
157. See State ex rel. WMC Issues Mobilization Council, Inc. v. Circuit Court for
Dane County, No. 96-3 133-W, at 10 (Wis. Ct App. Nov. 8, 1996). But see Colorado
Republican Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 1 16 S. Ct. 2309, 2316 (1996) (plurality opinion)
(suggesting that Buckley's conclusion that independent expenditures did not pose the
same risk of a "quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate" is still
controlling) (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47).
158. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
159. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 800 (1989).
160. FEC v. Furgatch, 807 F.2d 857, 862 (9th Cir. 1987).
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the same time, courts attempt to ensure that the purposes of the Act
" are fully carried out, that they are not cleverly circumvented, or

thwarted by a rigid construction of the terms of the Act. " 1 61

•

The new FEC approach, in contrast to the bright-line rule, provides
more complete coverage of independent expenditures and allows for
more effective enforcement of the FECA. The magic words interpreta
tion of Buckley's express advocacy standard runs the risk of thwarting
the impact of the FECA's reporting and disclosure requirements.1 62 FEC
officials have recognized that a magic words test allows organizations
or individuals supporting a candidate to · easily avoid the reach of the
Act by simply avoiding key words, while communicating the same
message which is unmistakably directed at electoral advocacy. 163
A good example of the broader application of the new regulations
can be seen by analyzing its application to the hypothetical NRA
Clinton advertisement example used in the introduction - the one that
urged people not to let "Bill Clinton do it to us again . " 1 64 Under the lit
eral approach, the communication does not include any of the magic
words of Buckley. Thus, the NRA would not have to report the expendi
ture or make a disclosure on the communication. Under the context
sensitive approach, the fact that the advertisement was only a few days
away from a major presidential election, included a great deal of discus
sion about the campaign, and encouraged people in three days not to
"let Bill Clinton do it to us again" gives context to the communica-

161. 807 F.2d at 862.
1 62. See 807 F.2d at 862.
163. See Camey, supra note 23, at 1315 (quoting FEC General Counsel Lawrence
M. Noble); see also Furgatch, 807 F.2d at 863. The same could be said for proposals
which apply a bright-line rule on time. See Hayward, supra note 44, at 88-95 (sug
gesting a bright-line rule on time near the end of the campaign); see also 57 Fed. Reg.
33,547, 33,560 (1992) (proposed July 29, 1992) (presenting Alternative A-2
a defini
tion of express advocacy that the FEC considered and rejected - which advocates a
time-buffer provjsion allowing the FEC to treat all messages mentioning a candidate as
express advocacy if the communication appears within a certain number of days prior to
the election). Clever campaigners simply could run advertisements just before the dead
line, circumventing the rule but still having a significant impact on the election. The
real problem, however, is that there is no reason to suspect that the time just before the
election is any more critical to a campaign. A communication made early on in the pri
mary, without disclosure or reporting, may hinder (or help) a candidate to such an ex
tent that her fate is fixed. A prime example is a vicious attack early in a primary from
an undisclosed source. Such an early attack may mean that a candidate is unable to
raise money or gain endorsements from key people. The campaign may never fully re
cover. Although this may do damage to a candidate regardless of whether there is dis
closure and reporting by the party responsible for the independent expenditure, if there
is disclosure and reporting, financial supporters, endorsers, and the media may make a
more informed decision regarding how much weight to give the communication.
164. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text
-
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tion's express message: "Vote against Bill Clinton so he cannot take our
weapons away." Under the new FEC regulations, the NRA would be
required to place a disclosure on the advertisement and report the
amount of the expenditure to the FEC.
Adopting a more flexible rule - one that gets at more of the com
munications having the effect, or perception, of influencing elections better avoids corruption, and the perception of corruption, in our politi
cal process. Having access to information about who a candidate's sup
porters and detractors are allows the public to make a more informed
decision about the candidates and their positions. Those who are avid

NRA supporters might be more inclined to vote against Bill Clinton. On
the other hand, voters who support gun owner's rights, but are suspect
of the NRA , might be more cautious in accepting the advertisement's
claims. Perhaps these people support the right to own guns in general,
but agree with Clinton's views regarding restrictions on the right to own
automatic assault weapons. Requiring the disclosure on the advertise
ment may make a great deal of difference in the minds of these
voters.165
Finally, as the Court noted in Buckley, the fact that the regulations
only require reporting and disclosure for individuals and groups, rather
than an outright ban on such expenditures,166 . means that the regulations
create only a " 'reasonable and minimally restrictive' effect on the ex
ercise of First Amendment rights" while protecting issue advocacy.167
C.

Consistency With Other Areas of First Amendment Law

The context-sensitive approach is consistent with the Court's treat
ment of various other areas of First Amendment law. For a court to re
quire a bright-line test, and to hold that a court can never look to the
context of the communication to determine if the speech can be regu
lated, would require invalidating a litany of similarly based First

Amendment restrictions previously upheld by the Court. 1 68 For example,

" [t]he doctrines of subversive speech, 'fighting words,' libel, and
speech in the workplace and in public fora illustrate that when and
where speech takes place can determine its legal significance. In these

1 65. See Furgatch, 807 F.2d at 862.
166. But see supra note 74 (discussing the fact that corporations are prohibited
from making such expenditures from nonsegregated funds based on a lower degree of
First Amendment protection of corporate political speech).
167. Furgatch, 807 F.2d 862 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 82); see also 60 Fed.
Reg. 35,292, 35,295 (1995).
168. See Furgatch, 807 F.2d at 863.
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instances, context is one of the crucial factors making these kinds of
speech regulable." 169
Fighting words are not regulated by a bright-line rule because a
more flexible approach is needed to ensure that the compelling govern
mental interests are met; yet, the First Amendment interests involved
are still protected.170 The Court never simply says that certain words al
ways will constitute fighting words. Rather, the words derive their
meaning, as fighting words, from the context in which they are used.
Professor Stephen Gard has pointed out that for the words to be consid
ered "fighting words" they must "hav.e a direct tendency to cause an
immediate violent response by the average recipient, " 171 be "uttered
face-to-face to the addressee, " 172 and be "directed to an individual. " 173
Thus, the court must look to the context of the words to determine if
the government can punish the speaker for the use of "fighting
words. " 174 A bright-line rule would not strike a proper balance between
the government's interest in ensuring public safety and the First
Amendment interests at stake.
Another prime example of the Court granting the government the
ability to regulate otherwise protected speech because of the context in
which it arose occurred in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,175 which dealt
with the regulation of indecent language on the public airwaves. In

Pacifica a local radio station aired, during an early weekday afternoon,
a monologue by the satirist George Carlin. The monologue was part of
a larger program by the radio station to discuss attitudes toward lan
guage and the Carlin piece included his well-known bit about the seven

169. Furgatch, 807 F.2d at 863. In Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36
(1961), Justice Harlan, writing for the Court, also recognized that the Court has consist
ently found some "speech in certain contexts, [to be] outside the scope of constitutional
protection." 366 U.S. at 50 (emphasis added) (footnote and citations omitted).
170. See Furgatch, 807 F.2d at 863.
171. Stephen W. Gard, Fighting Words as Free Speech, 58 WASH. U. L.Q. 53 1,
536 (1980) (citing Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972); Cohen v. California, 403
U.S. 15 (1971); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969); Chaplinsky v. New Hamp
shire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)).
172. Id. at 536 (citing Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 408 U.S. 913 (1972)
(Powell, J., concurring)).
173. Id. at 536 (citing Gooding, 405 U.S. at 518; Cohen, 403 U.S. at 15; Chaplin
sky, 3 15 U.S. at 568).
174. See id. at 536 (arguing that these contextual factors are what courts look to in
detennining words' status as "fighting words," but arguing for abolishment of the
"fighting words" doctrine as a relic of past morality). But see Gooding, 405 U.S. at 537
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (clain!ing that "the Court, despite its protestations to the con
trary, is merely paying lip service to Chaplinsky" and that the Court has gone too far in
narrowing the application of the "fighting words" doctrine).
175. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
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dirty words which "you definitely wouldn't say ever" on the public air
waves. The FCC, while not asserting that it could ban nonobscene but
"indecent" language from all airwaves at all times, argued that the con
text was all-important and that it could therefore keep this kind of lan
guage off the airwaves in the early afternoon, when children were more
likely to be in the audience.176 The Court upheld the FCC position, not
ing that while these words are entitled to some First Amendment pro
tection, their "social value" depends on the context in which they are
used.177 Thus, the FCC had the right to take the context of the commu
nication into account, and the regulations were regulable only because
of the context in which they were used.
These doctrines demonstrate that the Court believes context
sensitive approaches are the most effective means of balancing the com
pelling governmental interests against the free speech rights of individu
als and groups. Under the same reasoning, a context-sensitive approach
is necessary for determining when independent e�penditures can be reg
ulated. Without it, a vast number of communications that the govern
ment has a compelling interest in regulating will escape the reporting
and disclosure requirements.

CONCLUSION
The Buckley Court's express advocacy standard is a positive step
in that it protects fundamental First Amendment interests implicated
when Congress attempts to regulate in an area as sacred as political
speech. At the same time, it recognizes the reality that regulating elec
tions helps to ensure the integrity of the American republic by provid
ing fair elections and working to root out corruption within the political
system.

If courts reject the new FEC regulations in favor of the literal ap
proach of the First Circuit, the role of independent expenditures in our
election process will no doubt continue to grow at an even more rapid
pace, unabated by the checks of public disclosure and reporting. It is
time for the courts to recognize that campaigning has changed. The
same fears of a decrease in public confidence in the fairness of our
electoral system, and in corruption from quid pro arrangements that led
Congress and the Court to accept stricter regulation of direct contribu
tions, now surround independent expenditures. Because of the impor
tance of the freedom of speech - and its particular importance in the
political arena - courts must walk a tightrope when it comes to the

176. See 438 U.S. at 731-34.
177. See 438 U.S. at 747-48 (Stevens, J.).
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regulation of independent expenditures. The courts must now give the
government the ability to lasso the corruption, actual and perceived, that
comes with well-financed independent expenditure campaigns by spe
cial interest groups.
A context-sensitive approach will certainly not be sufficient to

clean up the entire political process. But this approach can ensure that
the public gets more information regarding the funding of campaign ad
vertisements and which special interest group is spending hundreds of
thousands of dollars to elect or defeat which candidate. This informa
tion allows the public, and particularly the media, who can broadcast
such information to a wide audience, the ability to make better judg
ments about the content and veracity of particular communications. It
provides the FEC and citizen "watch dog " organizations the ability to
discover corruption or expose politicians who provide special favors for
groups that have made independent expenditures for them. In short, the
FEC's approach gives the American people important information re
garding a candidate's supporters or detractors - often critical informa
tion in helping people determine who they want their representatives to
be - without overly restricting First Amendment rights.

